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Abstract—Keystroke timing based active authentication systems are
conceptually attractive because: (i) they use the keyboard as the sensor
and are not hardware-cost prohibitive, and (ii) they use the keystrokes
generated from normal usage of computers as input and are not inter-
ruptive. Several experiments have been reported on the performance
of keystroke based authentication using small datasets. None of them,
however, study a practical active authentication system, and the fea-
sibility of keystroke based active authentication system for large scale
and continuous deployment is still not demonstrated in the literature.
We investigate this issue and establish that keystroke based active
authentication systems can be highly accurate and scalable. We use
a real active authentication system that we developed and analyze a
dataset large enough to produce statistically significant results. We also
present empirical methodologies used for characterizing various design
parameters of the developed system.
Index Terms—Biometrics, active authentication, keystroke dynamics.
1 INTRODUCTION
Traditional methods for user authentication, such as pass-
words, PINs, or fingerprint scans are designed for login-
point entry and therefore cannot prevent unauthorized ac-
cess to a computer after login. A solution to this problem
is in-session authentication of a user at frequent intervals,
a process known as active authentication. Adopting conven-
tional methods such as passwords or fingerprint scans for
active authentication is impractical because they require
explicit user participation and therefore will interrupt the
user at every authentication event. For this reason, active
authentication systems rely on behavioral biometrics like
keystroke dynamics [1] (how the user types), mouse dy-
namics [2] (how the user uses the mouse), and/or gaze
dynamics [3] (how the user gazes the screen). The moti-
vation behind using behavioral biometrics is that they can
be acquired from the user’s natural interaction with the
computer, thereby allowing the user to implicitly participate
in the authentication process without getting interrupted.
Among the various behavioral biometrics that have been
considered for active authentication [2]–[6], keystroke dy-
namics remains one of the most studied. Though there
are many papers on keystroke based active authentication
(e.g., [4], [7]–[11]), the results reported in most of them are
derived from small datasets, representing tens or at most a
few hundreds of individuals (with the exception of [11]).
Further, most studies in keystroke authentication focus
their evaluations on false accept, false reject, and equal
error rate metrics. These metrics, while useful for evaluating
the distinctiveness of keystroke biometric (i.e., its ability to
distinguish between any two users), do not fully capture
the operational performance of an active authentication
system. An operational active authentication system would
not only seek to minimize false accept and false reject
rates, but also time-to-authenticate and time-to-unauthenticate.
Time-to-authenticate is the period of time between two
authentication events and measures how closely the system
approximates ‘continuity’ in authentication. A large time-to-
authenticate translates to more time to detect an impostor,
especially if the impostor hijacks the session immediately
after an authentication event. Time-to-unauthenticate is the
amount of time required to identify an imposter once the
imposter starts typing. This metric determines how long
an imposter may have access to a system guarded with
keystroke based active authentication system.
1.1 Contributions of Our Paper
In this paper, we present a keystroke based active authenti-
cation system, which integrates multi-classifier selection, de-
cision fusion, and threshold selection. We evaluate our sys-
tem’s performance on a large dataset containing keystrokes
from 736 users. To our knowledge, ours is the only work that
extensively tests a keystroke based active authentication sys-
tem using both operational (time-to-authenticate and time-
to-unauthenticate) and distinctiveness (false accept, false
reject, and half total error rate) metrics.
We compare the performance of our system with the
approaches presented in three previous studies, by Gunetti
and Picardi [4], Sim and Janakiraman [12], and Shimshon et
al. [7]. We show that the performance of their approaches
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2significantly drop when tested with our dataset, reaffirming
the importance of using large keystroke datasets for bench-
marking. However, such datasets are not currently easily
accessible to the research community. A key contribution
of our work is a free text dataset from 736 users that can
be used to benchmark future typing-behavior based active
authentication systems. We make the dataset available to
public at www.latech.edu/active-authentication.
Though thresholding is an important step in an opera-
tional active authentication system, the impact of threshold-
ing methods on the performance of keystroke-based active
authentication has not received much attention. We evalu-
ate three thresholding methods (K-Chen, population-based
HTER minimization, and user-specific HTER minimization).
We show that user-specific HTER minimization outperforms
the other two. Further, we show that the performance of
user-specific thresholds is stable across different population
sizes (ranging between 100 and 736) and across fixed-sized
populations with non-overlapping users (population size
was set to 100 users).
1.2 Organization of Our Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 presents the details of our active authentication system.
Section 3 presents the experiments. Section 4 presents our
results. Section 5 compares the performance of existing
solutions to our work. We conclude in Section 6.
2 DETAILS OF OUR APPROACH
2.1 Feature Sets and Authentication Algorithms
A keystroke timing feature is determined by the press and
release times of the associated keys. It can be a uni-graph
involving just one key, digraph involving two consecutive
keys or multi-graph involving more than two consecutive
keys. While higher graphs provide more distinguishing
contexts, their availability (i.e., frequency of a multi-graph
in a given text) is low which makes them less usable. In
general, digraphs provide a compromise between context
and availability and are popularly used for keystroke based
authentication [1], [4], [9]. Although the authors in [12] claim
that digraphs do not work well for free texts if their word
contexts are not considered, our findings do not support that
result. We considered both uni-graph and digraph features
in our study. We also considered uni-graphs with adjacent
key context and found them to outperform other keystroke
timing features reported in the literature. Altogether, we
investigated the following seven types of timing features.
(i) Key hold latency (KH) – the time elapsed between
press and release of a given key,
(ii) Inter key latency (IK) – the time elapsed between
the release of a key and press of the next key,
(iii) Key press latency (KP) – the time elapsed between
the presses of two consecutive keys,
(iv) Key release latency (KR) – the time elapsed between
the releases of two consecutive keys,
(v) Key hold latency with next key context (KHnext) –
KH features for a given key, grouped by the next
adjacent character,
(vi) Key hold latency with previous key context (KHprev)
– KH features for a given key, grouped by the
previous adjacent character, and
(vii) Key hold latency with word context (KHwc) – KH
features for a given key, grouped by the word in
which the character occurs.
We implemented five authentication algorithms (i.e.,
verifiers) that have been recommended in the literature
[9-11]. Two of these algorithms are distance based (SM:
Scaled Manhattan [1] and SE: Scaled Euclidean [1]), two are
matching-ratio based (A: Absolute [4] and S: Similarity [9])
and one is order based (R: Relative [4]).
2.2 Decision Threshold Determination
Once a verifier computes a score for a keystroke-sample, it
has to make a decision whether that sample belongs to an
genuine user or not. The standard approach is to establish
a decision threshold to determine whether a score belongs
to the genuine user or not, so that the system objective (e.g.,
authentication accuracy or EER or HTER, etc.) is optimized.
While computing the thresholds we choose to optimize Half
of Total Error Rate (HTER). HTER is computed by averaging
False Accept Rate (FAR) and False Reject Rate (FRR). HTER
approximates Equal Error Rate (EER) but is computationally
less expensive and more practical [13]. We examined three
methods: 1) user-specific HTER minimization, 2) population
based HTER minimization, and 3) K-Chen method, which is
a hybrid method that computes user-specific thresholds us-
ing user-specific statistics and population-based parameters.
Details follow.
2.2.1 HTER Minimization Thresholding
For each verifier-feature pair, we compute a set of scores for
the training data set. Then, for computing the user-specific
threshold for a given verifier-feature pair, we consider
the values located between the minimum and maximum
scores range for the associated user for that verifier as the
candidate thresholds. Considering each of those values as
thresholds we compute corresponding HTERs. The thresh-
old that generates the lowest HTER is considered to be
the final threshold. The population based HTER method
computes thresholds in a similar manner, scanning all users’
scores rather than one individual’s score, to determine the
threshold.
2.2.2 K-Chen Thresholding
The K-Chen method [13] is a user-specific thresholding
method that uses user-specific statistics along with several
population-based parameters. This method has been suc-
cessfully used in speaker verification systems. The K-Chen
threshold is calculated as TK−Chen = b(µ′+aσ′)+(1− b)µ,
where µ, µ′ and σ′ respectively are the mean of genuine
and imposter scores and standard deviation of imposter
scores. a and b are population based parameters, empirically
computed such that the corresponding thresholds produce
the best accuracies. Alternatively, these values can be set
such that the resultant thresholds match with the population
based HTER thresholds.
32.3 Decision Fusion
Our decision to construct a fusion based system is motivated
by the findings in [14] that the biometric performance of an
individual may significantly vary from use of one algorithm
to another. In addition, numerous studies found that multi-
classifier systems, in general, produce better decisions than
a single classifier [15]–[17].
Our system includes five verifiers and seven types of
keystroke features. Together, they form thirty-five combina-
tions of verifier-feature pairs and produce thirty-five deci-
sions. Fusion of these decisions adds new challenges such
as (1) how to assign weight to each verifier and (2) how to
deal with the decision correlations among different verifiers.
We assign weights to verifiers’ decisions using the Si-
multaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA)
algorithm [18]. The advantage of SPSA is that it naturally
normalizes the effect of classifier correlations through the
proper weighing of individual classifier decisions during
decision fusion. This process makes one classifier more or
less contributing than the other, and even resulting some to
be totally ignored (i.e., by assigning a weight equal to 0).
Further, SPSA is not affected by the dimensionality of the
gradient vector as it depends on the measurement of the
objective function, not on its gradient. However, because
it is an approximation algorithm, it is possible that the
average HTER achieved using this algorithm is not optimal.
If, however, the optimal HTER is attained, changing the
associated fusion threshold will not improve the average
HTER further; otherwise it may. Based on this observation,
once verifier decision weight assignment was complete, we
scanned over false reject rate vs. false accept rate graph and
re-adjusted the fusion threshold if doing so resulted in a
lower average HTER.
3 EXPERIMENTS
3.1 Data Set Collection
The work reported herein is based upon a large dataset
collected from 736 subjects - primarily the students and fac-
ulty of Louisiana Tech University. Louisiana Tech University
undertook a Institutional Review Board-approved large-
scale, multi-year keystroke data collection project known as
“Typing for Ten” and this dataset is a part of that collection.
Typing data from the 736 subjects was gathered in two
phases. In the first phase, data from 570 of the 736 subjects
was collected between April 18 through May 8th 2012.
Data from the remaining 166 subjects was collected between
October 15, 2012, and October 31, 2012. The April/May and
October groups are completely distinct in that no individual
subject is counted as participating in both phases.
3.2 Data Collection Protocol
3.2.1 Two-session Data Collection
Each of the 736 subjects in this study typed in two separate
sessions: the gap between the two sessions ranged from 0
to 19 days. In each session, the participants were asked to
type at least 300 characters in response to each of twelve
questions presented to them. Thus the minimum number
of keystrokes collected per subject per session was 3600.
However, most of the subjects tried to answer the questions
to the best of their ability and ended up over-typing. As
a result, the average number of keystrokes collected per
user per session surpassed the minimum. In Phase 1, we
collected 5222 and 5085 keystrokes on average per user, in
sessions 1 and 2 respectively. In Phase 2, we collected 4820
and 4704 keystrokes on average per user, in sessions 1 and
2 respectively.
3.2.2 Application Context
The data were collected in a single application context -
the data collection application occupied the entire screen
and other functions of the host computers were locked out
during data acquisition. The subjects typed their answers to
the twelve questions they were asked during each session in
a window-based text-editor. Once an answer was submitted,
the next question popped up and the window was automat-
ically refreshed. The order of the questions was randomized
for each subject.
3.2.3 Acquiring Free-text Keystrokes
The subjects typed free text, i.e., whatever they could think
of in response to a given question. The questions were
designed to require different levels of cognitive load, as
is expected in real life scenarios. The cognitive load of
individual queries is categorized according to the six levels
specified in the revised Bloom’s Taxonomy [19]. The six
levels of cognitive load, from the lowest to the highest,
are: (1) Remembering, (2) Understanding, (3) Applying, (4)
Analyzing, (5) Evaluating, and (6) Creating. For example,
a participant may be asked “What is your favorite season
/ time of year and what do you like about it?” (Level 1
- Remembering); or “Give a brief, but sufficiently detailed,
plot description of your favorite book / story / movie.”
(Level 4 - Analyzing); or “If you were to draw a picture
of any type of landscape you wanted, what objects would
you include in it? How would you go about drawing the
landscape?” (Level 6 - Creating).
3.2.4 Data Anonymization
To protect the privacy of participants, the raw data was
anonymized with randomly generated IDs before being
used in this project.
3.3 Training & Testing
3.3.1 Training
Our training process consisted of two steps: profile genera-
tion and parameter setting. During profile generation, 3,300
keystrokes from Session 1 were used to generate templates
(profiles) of each individual by averaging their keystroke
timings for those keystrokes.
During parameter setting, the rest of the keystrokes
from Session 1 were used to test against the users’ pro-
files to compute genuine scores. Additionally, Session 1
data from thirty randomly selected imposters was used
per genuine user to compute impostor scores. These scores
were then used to compute verification thresholds using the
HTER minimization and K-Chen methods. For the K-Chen
method, we used the population-based HTER thresholds for
determining the population based K-Chen parameters. Once
the thresholds were generated, we computed decisions for
4each of the scores. We then used the Simultaneous Perturba-
tion Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) algorithm [18] to find
classifier weights for decision fusion.
3.3.2 Testing
Session 2 data was used to provide pristine test data com-
pletely separate from training data. All of the Session 2
genuine data per user and randomly selected imposter data
from 30 other users was tested against the templates created
with Session 1. Different sets of imposters were selected for
each user during training and testing. Authentication deci-
sions (genuine or imposter) were made using the thresholds
computed during the training phase. Finally, decision fusion
was performed using the classifier weights and the fusion
threshold computed during training.
3.3.3 Test setup for computing time-to-unauthenticate
For computing time-to-unauthenticate, we simulated transi-
tion between genuine and imposter samples by interleaving
a genuine sample among 30 imposter samples collected
from 30 different randomly selected imposters. For each
user, we created the following sample sequence:
GA − IA,1 −GA − IA,2 − · · · −GA − IA,30
where GA refers to the keystroke samples from a genuine
user A and IA,i refers to the keystroke samples from im-
postor i (i 6= A). Time between the last keystroke of an
individual and the first keystroke of the next individual
was ignored since in reality two individuals did not type
continuously one after another. As explained in Section
4.3, the first authentication decision is made after the first
sample (550 keystrokes) is presented and the subsequent
decisions are made at 55th keystroke thereafter.
4 RESULTS
Table 1 shows the average of user-specific HTERs for each
of the thirty-five verifier-feature pairs we tested. The lowest
average HTER of any individual classifier is about .07 – for
“ScaledEuclidean −KHnext” verifier-feature pair. Table 1
also presents the averages of user-specific error rates after
SPSA-based fusion was performed and decision thresholds
are adjusted. It shows that the user-specific HTER threshold
based scheme, clearly, is the winner.
In addition to achieving 0.01 HTER, user-specific HTER
thresholding yielded 0.008 FAR and 0.013 FRR. This means it
is less likely to err towards reporting an imposter as genuine
than to report that a genuine user is an imposter. In other
words, it is more sensitive to reporting actual imposters, at
the cost of being a bit more likely to raise false alarms.
Figure 1 explains the overall error characteristics of the
three threshold schemes we studied. Figure 1 shows that
for each of the schemes most of the users perform better
than the average HTER while a few users have very high
HTERs. Although the list of the worst 20% users signifi-
cantly overlapped in all schemes, their relative performance
varied between schemes. For instance, the worst HTER
scores under the population-based HTER threshold were
generated by subject 1070 (HTER of 0.47 which is essentially
equivalent to random guesses) and subject 1974 (HTER
of 0.31). These same two individuals were also the worst
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Fig. 1: HTER distributions for three thresholding methods.
performing under the K-Chen method, though their HTERs
improved substantially – 0.22 for subject 1070 and 0.13
for subject 1974. Interestingly, the worst two HTER scores
under the user-specific HTER method belonged to different
subjects: subject 485 with an HTER of 0.18 and subject 1515
with an HTER of 0.1469. Thus, not only does user specific
HTER outperform the other two methods in the average
case, it substantially outperforms them even on the small
number of poorly performing subjects.
Though the user-specific HTER threshold scheme
yielded the best HTER in 572 out of 736 cases, in 97 cases K-
Chen method outperformed the user-specific method and in
58 cases the population based HTER method outperformed
the user-specific method. Additionally, in 9 cases both K-
Chen and population based HTER methods outperformed
the user-specific method. Given these results, an interesting
proposal for future investigation would be to vary the
threshold selection method on a subject by subject basis to
improve the overall system accuracy.
5TABLE 1: Average HTERs achieved with 35 different verifier-feature combinations and fusion.
IK KH KPL KRL KH Next KH Prev KH WC
Absolute 0.220249 0.175669 0.178495 0.145255 0.08576 0.165354 0.137037
Relative 0.110346 0.141892 0.140179 0.11691 0.097149 0.162492 0.188772
Scaled Euclidean 0.232715 0.07778 0.266054 0.235706 0.070852 0.095591 0.133891
Scaled Manhattan 0.166021 0.086954 0.173984 0.164906 0.095727 0.099156 0.1318754
Similarity 0.319568 0.239606 0.270084 0.197835 0.118748 0.239804 0.153775
Fusion with User-Specific Thresholding 0.010607411 (FAR: 0.007921923; FRR: 0.013292899)
Fusion with K-Chen Thresholding 0.014581887 (FAR: 0.015217012; FRR: 0.014581887)
Fusion with Population-based Thresholding 0.023132105 (FAR: 0.01897904; FRR: 0.023132105)
While inspecting the typed texts of the users with the
worst HTERs, we did not notice any anomalies except for
the subject 1070. Subject 1070, most of the time, instead of
typing meaningful answers to the the given questions, typed
random characters, such as the following: “ GH G G G G HG
HG HG G UH UY UYUY UYU YUY UY UY Y Y Y Y...”
With population based HTER thresholding, the FRR,
FAR and HTER for subject 1070 respectively were, 0.94, 0,
and 0.470760234 respectively. Which means, almost all of
the tested samples were identified as imposter samples. This
happened because the mechanical nature of the typed text
most likely deviated from the population characteristics.
When user-specific HTER thresholds were used, the profile
created using “mechanical” timings became closer to the
timings of the test samples that were also characterized by
these “mechanical” timings.
4.0.1 A Closer Look at the Worst HTER Quintile
Multiple recent studies [14] [20] demonstrate that the av-
erage performance of a given biometric system is dispro-
portionately affected by a small segment of users. We find
the same to be true for keystroke based biometrics. In our
study, with user-specific HTER thresholding, 21.74% of the
subjects generated no error, 66.4% of the subjects performed
better than the average (HTER .01). The remaining (small)
percentage of the subjects had high HTERs, which primarily
drove average.
Figure 2a shows the distribution of HTERs by population
quintiles, when we used user-specific HTER thresholding. A
closer look to the worst quintile of the performers in Figure
2b reveals that 99.6% of the population have an overall
HTER of less than 0.1. In fact, only three out of 736 users had
an HTER greater than 0.1 and only one had HTER greater
than .15.
4.1 Stability of User-specific HTER Minimization
Thresholds
We further tested the stability of user-specific HTER min-
imization thresholding across different sizes of user pop-
ulations. Table 2 shows how the overall error rates are
impacted when the user-specific HTER threshold scheme
and fusion was used on (a) non-overlapping (i.e., users in
each group do not overlap) populations of identical size
and (b) populations of different sizes. The table reports
the standard deviation of HTERs in the second and fourth
columns. The low standard deviation in Column 2 indicates
that the HTERs are stable across groups of 100 users. The
low standard deviation in Column 4 indicates that the
HTERs are stable across different population sizes. The table
also reports the net deviations of HTERs. To calculate net
deviation, we used standard deviation formula with the
HTER for 736 users (i.e., 0.010607412) replacing the column-
wise mean of HTERs. The low net deviations indicate that
despite the different user populations and the population
sizes, the HTERs remain consistently close to the HTER
obtained with 736 users.
TABLE 2: System performance for various subsets of popu-
lation
Non-overlapping HTER Cumulative # Cumulative
# of Participants of Participants HTER
100 0.010700883 100 0.010700883
100 0.010413961 200 0.010557422
100 0.010511376 300 0.010542073
100 0.010844217 400 0.010617609
100 0.010485292 500 0.010591146
100 0.010700003 600 0.010609289
100 0.01053229 700 0.010598289
36 0.010784816 736 0.010607412
µ: 0.010621605
σ: 0.000156045
Net Deviation: 0.000146655 Net Deviation: 0.000047846
4.2 Separation between Training and Testing Sessions
Each of the subjects included in our study typed in two ses-
sions and the gap between the two sessions ranged from 0
to 19 days. The vast majority of the subjects (all but 47 of the
736 users) returned within 7 days to type the second session.
When we grouped users by 1 through 7 days of separation
between training and testing sessions, we observed that the
average authentication accuracies across the user groups
remained almost same, indicating the keystroke signatures
were consistent over multiple days. There was insufficient
data to look beyond the one week horizon.
Figure 3 shows the average accuracies for users grouped
by 1 through 7 days of separation between sessions. As
shown in Figure 3, the keystroke signatures of our test sub-
jects were consistent over multiple days, with no apparent
drop in system accuracy over the course of a week. There
was insufficient data to look beyond the one week horizon.
4.3 Time-to-authenticate and Time-to-unauthenticate
We observed that authentication performance of our system
saturates around 550 keystrokes. However, it takes on av-
erage 200 seconds for an average typist to type that many
keys. To avoid this delay without compromising accuracy,
we use a sliding window of 550 keystrokes. During each
authentication decision, we move the window by 1/10th
of its size, i.e., we discard 55 keys from the window and
6(a) Distribution of HTER for the test set
(b) Distribution of HTER for the worst 20% performers
Fig. 2: Distribution of HTERs
add 55 keys to it in a FIFO manner. Thus after the first
200 seconds, time-to-authenticate remains about 20 seconds
while a user is typing and authentication is always made
with 550 keystrokes.
In order to determine time-to-unauthenticate, we follow
the test protocol discussed in Section 3.3.3 and used a sliding
window of 550 keystrokes. We identified 92.25% of the
imposters within first 7 decisions i.e., 385 keystrokes. In
Figure 4, we show a histogram of the distribution of average
decisions required to unauthenticate an individual.
5 COMPARISON WITH EXISTING APPROACHES
Gunetti and Picardi [4] developed two algorithms for free
text based authentication that we included in this study.
Using Absolute and Relative algorithms on 205 individuals
they obtained a False Rejection Rate of less than 5% and a
False Accept Rate of less than 0.005%. However, using our
dataset, the accuracy of their technique drops to 93.34% with
an FRR of 6.61% and FAR of 6.59%.
Sim and Janakiraman [12] observed that if the digraphs
are fine-tuned with their word contexts, then, the accuracies
improve. Consideration of word contexts means that the
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“in” in “Bin” and “in” in “China” are two different features.
While there are advantages to taking this approach, it ex-
acerbates the issue of feature availability (e.g., the character
combination “in” generally appears much more frequently
than do the words “Bin” or “China”). Replicating their
method the best accuracy we were able to attain was 86.29%.
This disappointing result was due to a paucity of feature
availability.
Shimshon et al. [7] addressed the “time-to-authenticate”
issue in keystroke based active authentication. They pro-
posed the use of a group for digraphs with similar timings
as substitutions for missing features. That way, when a
digraph from a group is available, the timing for the other
digraphs (that are not typed) in that group can be estimated
resolving the feature availability issue and thus shortening
the time-to-authenticate period. However, doing so tends
to degrade the quality of the features. Although they claim
that their method performed better than existing methods,
their evaluation was performed based on only 21 legitimate
users. In our study we were able to attain an accuracy of
only 89.4% using their method.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a keystroke based active authentication sys-
tem and validated its performance on a large dataset of 736
subjects. We also release this dataset to the research commu-
nity to benchmark future active authentication systems. Our
experimental evaluations show that, with multi classifier
fusion and user-specific thresholding, the authentication
system was able to achieve as low as 0.0106 HTER with
20 seconds time-to-authenticate (after the first 200 seconds)
and requires an average of five attempts to unauthenticate.
Our future work will focus on the following directions:
(1) Building Resistance to Spoof Attacks: If someone’s typing
data were captured by a key-logger it might be possible for
an attacker to create a program that simulated the atomic
keystroke behavior of that user (see [9]). We are exploring
the use of pause and revision behavior, and demographic
and cognitive traits (extracted from the keystroke input)
to detect such attacks; and (2) Time Drift: Although we
inspected the impact of a week’s delay between profile
generation and actual use of the system for authentication -
finding no performance degradation over this limited time
period, we next intend to determine the stability of our
approach over extended time periods (months to years).
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